Mirna Fahmy

Syria’s latest wave of mass killings targeting Alawites, Christians, and Druze communities has triggered global condemnation against the new Syrian government. The government is led by Abu-Muhammed al-Julani (aka Ahmed Al Sharaa), a former Qaeda member, reinforcing concerns that stability and peace remain unattainable under his rule.

Gruesome videos depicting mass executions and armed militants storming homes, killing civilians, have surfaced online, shaping international public opinion. These atrocities, widely attributed to al-Julani’s Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), now operating under the state security apparatus following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime dispelling any claims that the victims were mere “Assad remnants.” Many of these executions were filmed and shared by HTS members themselves, who were seen celebrating the killings.

In response, the Syrian Ministry of Defense issued a directive prohibiting the filming of military operations, including bombings and destruction, under penalty of prosecution.

Official Reactions and Investigations

Commenting on the violence in the Sahel region, al-Julani stated:

“This blood will not go in vain without accountability or punishment, even if it is from our closest people. Assaulting people is a red line.”

The government has since announced the formation of an independent committee to investigate these crimes, blaming Assad loyalists and foreign actors for inciting unrest. The United Nations (UN), the United States (U.S.), and the Arab League have condemned the killings, calling for immediate justice.

The General Security Department of the Syrian Ministry of Interior also confirmed the arrest of four individuals accused of carrying out brutal attacks against civilians in coastal villages.

Dissent Within HTS

Some members of HTS have openly criticized the mass killings. Muhammed Hajab Abu-Obaida, an HTS fighter, denounced the atrocities, questioning their alignment with Islamic principles:

“Did religion teach us to drag civilians out of their homes who are staying safe and sound, only to kill them in cold blood? We did not hold up weapons to expel people from their homes but to stand with the oppressed.”

Abu-Obaida further challenged claims that the victims were remnants of the former regime and expressed shock over the actions of certain HTS factions. He called for accountability, asserting:

“The force needs purification. They are mercenaries, not jihadists like us.”

On March 9, al-Julani and military officials announced a halt in coastal operations, stating that individuals not affiliated with the security and military apparatus would be removed. However, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) debunked that, stating that media coverage of events has stopped, but on the ground, the stage of mass massacres have been moved to the stage of individual killings.

Claims on Media Manipulation

Amid the crisis, the Syrian Ministry of Information issued a statement dismissing the circulation of disturbing images and videos, labeling those sharing them as “hostile parties” engaged in a media campaign to incite chaos. The ministry claimed that many of the images being circulated were either outdated or taken outside of Syria, portraying them as part of an orchestrated effort to destabilize the country.

Conflicting Reports and International Response

While HTS militants filmed much of the violence, eyewitness accounts and video evidence verified by CNN also show government loyalists carrying out summary executions in Alawite villages, with perpetrators referring to a “cleansing” of Alawites. Human Rights Watch reported that the Syrian military operations command had mobilized approximately half a million fighters to defeat what it called the “Nusayri coup”—a derogatory term for Alawites. The government later acknowledged “individual violations” but attributed them to unorganized civilian groups rather than its forces.

Since December 2024, Human Rights Watch has also documented increasing sectarian incitement against Alawite and Shia-majority communities. This includes the vandalism and destruction of Alawite religious shrines and the widespread distribution of anti-Alawite leaflets. Reports of security sweeps leading to summary executions have also surfaced, particularly in Alawite-majority villages in the western Homs countryside since early January.

In an exclusive investigation, BBC Arabic interviewed three survivors who fled the massacres to the Lebanese border. The victims recounted how fighters knocked on their doors, executed their family members, and forced them to flee. Notably, some Alawite survivors emphasized that they had been opponents of the Assad regime, yet were still targeted in the violence.

Foreign Fighters in HTS:

It has been identified that HTS fighters include a significant number of foreign fighters, particularly from Central Asia. Among them are militants from Chechnya, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, many of whom are part of Katibat al-Imam al-Bukhari and the Turkistan Brigade. Videos have also surfaced showing Arabic-speaking fighters, including individuals from Egypt and Algeria.

In addition, Albanian fighters have been identified within HTS ranks. A notable unit, Albanian Tactical, operates under Xhemati Alban, comprising ethnic Albanians primarily from Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. This unit specializes in advanced military training, including sniper tactics and explosives, and plays a key role in training other HTS fighters.

As of August 2018, estimates suggested that HTS had around 3,000–4,000 foreign fighters among its total force of approximately 16,000 militants.

The presence of these foreign fighters has raised concerns internationally. Many countries have voiced strong opposition to their inclusion in HTS, viewing them as a destabilizing force in Syria and a potential security threat to their home nations.

What is Türkiye’s Role?

Despite widespread claims on social media that Türkiye backs HTS, the Turkish ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) spokesperson Ömer Çelik has firmly denied these allegations, calling them “entirely false.”

On February 4, 2025, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met with Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the interim president of Syria, in Ankara. Their discussions covered a range of issues, including security cooperation, economic recovery, and counterterrorism efforts, particularly in relation to Kurdish militants in northeastern Syria. Erdoğan acknowledged al-Julani’s commitment to fighting terrorism and pledged Türkiye’s support for Syria’s new administration.

Addressing the recent surge in violence, Erdoğan urged al-Julani to adopt a comprehensive approach to governance, warning against falling into the trap of revenge. He expressed confidence that all Syrians—Arabs, Turkmen, Kurds, Alawites, and Druze would act wisely and resist efforts by external actors seeking to divide the country and plunge it into further instability.

Controversial Agreement Between HTS and SDF

One of the most contentious developments following the power shift in Syria is the recent agreement between the new government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The terms of the agreement, made public via a Telegram channel affiliated with the new Syrian leadership, outline demands from both sides.

SDF’s key demands include:

• Recognition of its governing authority as an official part of the Syrian state.
• Expulsion of foreign elements from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s military ranks.
• A commitment to cease all attacks by the Turkish-backed National Army on SDF-controlled areas east of the Euphrates.
• Promises are made to include the following in the new Syrian constitution: Writing only the Syrian Republic. (Constitutional recognition of the Kurdish language as a second language in the country. Granting Kurds their cultural and educational rights: The government pledges to withdraw the Turkish army from Syrian territory.)

HTS, in turn, has put forward the following conditions:

• Recognition of the Syrian government in Damascus.
• Integration of the Autonomous Administration into the national structure.
• A 50% share of resources from the eastern region (including oil, agriculture, and other natural resources).
• Handing over foreign prisoners from ISIS to the government in Damascus and fully cooperating in this file.

Many people have expressed their happiness on the mutual agreements saying that finally SDF won and stability will “overshadow the torn-out country and everyone in Syria can settle in their homes and lives peacefully.” However, other oppositions tuned in assuming that the agreement wouldn’t last and soon tensions might erupt because after the agreement many Kurdish accounts reported that Türkiye bombed Kurdish territories.

The Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Gideon Sa’ar said in a recent interview with ABC news “We respect the will of Kurdish people in Syria to preserve their autonomy. But why did they (Damascus) not agree on that agreement before the massacre over the weekend? Why didn’t they respect the will of the Kurds before? We will follow the situation in Syria closely, preventing any existence of Jihadist on our borders with Syria” He added that they won’t agree to another October 7 attack with any of our fronts.

On the Druze side, the spiritual leader of the Syrian Druze community, Hikmat al-Hijri has rejected an agreement to integrate local entities into the state. He conveyed as follows: “We are working for our own interests as a sect. We are in a phase of being or not being. We will move towards what is appropriate for the sect.”

Syria’s New Constitution

On Thursday, March 13, 2025, Ahmed al-Sharaa signed the new 53-Constitutional Declaration terms that were drafted by the Constitutional Declaration Drafting Committee. This move aims to establish a legal framework for Syria’s transitional period.

Key Provisions of the New Constitution

The Syrian Constitutional Declaration Drafting Committee outlined the most prominent provisions of the new draft, including:

• The official name of the state remains the Syrian Arab Republic.
• The President must be Muslim, and Islamic jurisprudence shall be the primary source of legislation.
• Arabic is the official language of the state.
• The President of the Republic serves as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Armed Forces.
• Freedom of opinion, expression, media, publication, and the press is guaranteed.
• The state shall protect the social status of women, uphold their dignity, and ensure their right to education and work.
• The People’s Assembly has the right to summon and question ministers.
• The right to property ownership and women’s right to work and education are explicitly guaranteed.
• The People’s Assembly holds the authority to remove, dismiss, or reduce the president’s powers.
• The transitional period is set at five years.
• Only the state has the authority to establish military forces, prohibiting any individuals, entities, or groups from forming paramilitary organizations.
• The declaration of a state of emergency must receive approval from the National Security Council, and any extension requires People’s Assembly approval.

Reactions to the New Constitution

On Friday March 14, 2025, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) announced its complete rejection of the new constitutional declaration, criticizing it as a repackaging of authoritarianism that reinforces centralized rule and grants excessive powers to the executive authority.

In a statement posted on Facebook, the SDC—the political wing of the Kurdish-led SDF condemned the “National Dialogue Conference”, calling it unrepresentative of Syria’s diverse social and political components. The council stressed that any framework emerging from this conference would be insufficient to address Syria’s national crisis.