By Mirna Fahmy
The perception of the Middle East has long been fraught with complexity, but in late September 2025, US Ambassador to Türkiye and Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack injected a highly reductive, yet widely debated, viewpoint into the public discourse. His controversial assertion—that the region consists merely of “tribes, villages, and countryside” rather than cohesive “countries”—tapped into a vein of thought that views the area as fundamentally fractured.
Barrack was explicit, stating: “There is no Middle East. You know that. There are tribes and villages. The nation-state was created by the British and the French in 1916. The Sykes-Picot said, ‘Okay, we’re going to take what was the Ottoman Empire and we’re going to draw straight lines around it, and we’re going to call these nation states.’ But the Middle East doesn’t work that way. It starts with individual, family, village, then tribe, community, religion. Lastly, the nation.”
This reductive view, whether embraced or intensely debated on social media, underscores a deeper, more pervasive narrative: the Middle East is now overwhelmingly perceived as the epicenter of global conflict and instability. Since World War II, the region has tragically been the stage for a near-constant succession of wars, revolutions, civil strife, and geopolitical proxy battles. This relentless series of conflicts has defined the modern identity of the Middle East, transforming the very term into a shorthand for international crisis and humanitarian disaster. The area is no longer merely a geographical marker but a tragic symbol of the devastating human and political toll of post-colonial power struggles, oil politics, and the clash of regional and global interests.
Critical reactions see his statement as a blunt but historically grounded reminder of the complex and fragmented identities in the region that challenge the idea of cohesive Middle Eastern nation-states. Some interpret his words as highlighting the impossibility of political alignment or unity among the over 100 ethnic groups within the artificial borders drawn a century ago.
At the same time, some critics have viewed Barrack’s remarks as overly simplistic or even dismissive of the rich history and urban civilizations that existed in the Middle East long before modern borders, citing the significant cities and cultural centers like Baghdad, Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Cairo. These critics argue that the statement overlooks the historical presence of states and empires and the concept of political unity under various caliphates and kingdoms.
Others interpret Barrack’s perspective as a political commentary aimed at explaining why peace deals or regional alignments have historically been difficult or elusive, especially given his role in US diplomatic efforts amid ongoing conflicts and peace negotiations in the Middle East.
While Barrack’s statement reflects a recognized reality of ethnic and tribal diversity and the artificial nature of current borders, it has also stirred debate about how to understand the political and cultural identities of the Middle East and the appropriate approach to diplomacy in the region.
This isn’t the first time for Barrack to give provoking statements on the region or any country related to it. He made it clear that the U.S. position is against a federal model for Syria, emphasizing that the country must remain unified under “one Syria, one army, one government.” Barrack ruled out the possibility of separate autonomous regions or a fragmented federal system, asserting: “There’s not going to be six countries. There’s going to be one Syria.” His reasoning is based on preserving Syria’s territorial integrity and preventing fragmentation that could fuel separatism or sectarian divisions.
His comments prompted criticism from various Syrian political parties and Kurdish factions representing the Autonomous Administration of North like Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)– formed as a rebel alliance in the Syrian civil war with American support––and East Syria, who accused him of dismissing their democratic self-administration model and undermining inclusive political solutions when sectarian violence is ongoing on the Syria’s grounds. They argued that the federal system is a viable model for managing Syria’s diversity and ensuring democratic participation.
The origin of the word:
The term “Middle East” originated from the British perspective in the 1850s in the British India Office, used to describe the region between the “Near East” (the Ottoman Empire) and the “Far East” (East Asia) from a European viewpoint. American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan popularized the term in 1902, referring to the area around the Persian Gulf as a crucial strategic point between Britain and India during a period of geopolitical rivalry with Russia.
Opposition to the term “Middle East” exists within some Arab circles because it is viewed as a geopolitical construct of European colonialism that fails to reflect the true identity or sociopolitical reality of Arab nations. Critics argue the term lacks clear, consistent geographical boundaries and inappropriately groups a vast region with tremendous diversity of peoples and cultures, making a unified regional vision impossible. They often favor alternative terms that emphasize Arab identity and belonging as the core regional system. Furthermore, discussions about a “New Middle East” or reshaping the region—which often touch upon issues of fragmentation and sectarianism—only reinforce the term’s controversial nature, reflecting the deep instability and lack of popular trust prevalent in many Arab streets today.
The history:
The current political map and deep-seated conflicts in the Middle East are rooted in the aftermath of World War I, which saw the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after approximately 400 years of rule over territories that now constitute between 16 and 18 modern countries. As the Ottoman Empire was losing the war, British diplomat Sir Mark Sykes and French diplomat François Georges-Picot secretly negotiated the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement to partition the empire’s Middle Eastern holdings, particularly the Levant, into zones of control. This agreement, focusing on geopolitical interests rather than local ethnic or religious factors, set the stage for many of the region’s arbitrary modern borders.
The agreement assigned control over future Syria and Lebanon to France, and territories that would become Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan to the United Kingdom. Under the subsequent French Mandate system (1920-1946), France executed a deliberate “divide and rule” strategy in Syria and Lebanon by exploiting existing sectarian and ethnic divisions to undermine national unity. In Syria, this resulted in the country’s fragmentation into ethnic and sectarian statelets—such as the Alawite State, the State of Jabal al-Druze, and the predominantly Sunni State of Damascus and Aleppo—while in Lebanon, France created Greater Lebanon with expanded borders to protect and favor the Maronite Christian population and other minorities. This political fracturing was reinforced by France’s establishment of a security apparatus that intentionally favored loyal minority groups, including Alawites, Druze, and Christians, thereby excluding the Sunni majority and profoundly deepening the social and ethnic rift.
Crucially, these colonial designs contradicted promises made to the Arabs during the war. Sharif Hussein bin Ali (1853–1931), the Emir of Mecca, had led the Great Arab Revolt against the Ottomans starting in 1916 in alliance with Britain, with the aim of establishing a unified, independent Arab state under Hashemite rule. After the Ottomans were defeated, Hussein briefly became the ruler of an independent Kingdom of Hejaz in 1916. However, Britain and France proceeded with the secret Sykes-Picot and Balfour Declaration agreements, essentially carving up the promised territories into mandates. Hussein refused to ratify the subsequent treaties he believed undermined Arab independence, a stance that led Britain to withdraw its support. Consequently, Hussein’s rival, Ibn Saud of Nejd, conquered the Hejaz in 1925, ending Hashemite rule there. Though Hussein died in exile, his sons, Faisal and Abdullah, were installed as rulers of British-mandated Iraq and Transjordan (later Jordan), respectively.
Specifically, at the 1921 Cairo Conference, British Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill agreed to establish an independent emirate in Transjordan under British protection, placing Prince Abdullah in charge. Abdullah was viewed by the British as a stable and experienced figure capable of managing tribal affairs and achieving stability. Meanwhile, the region west of the Jordan River was designated Mandatory Palestine (1920–1948), a geographical rather than political term that had previously been Ottoman administrative districts. The end of the British Mandate in 1948 and the subsequent declaration of Israeli independence, followed immediately by the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, resulted in the current borders of Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. It was during this period that Arabs in the region began using the term “Palestinian” to express a distinct national identity.
Ideologies:
Arab and regional analysts suggest a complex, often indirect, relationship where Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups associated with “political Islam,have sometimes operated in ways that inadvertently or covertly served the interests of the Zionist movement and Israel. A prominent example cited by Arab sources is Israel’s tacit allowance of Brotherhood-affiliated groups to build social, economic, and cultural infrastructure in historical Palestine, particularly the West Bank and Gaza Strip, during the 1970s and 1980s. This allowance was allegedly intended to counter the Fatah movement and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which represented the official, secular resistance, thereby strengthening the influence of political Islam as an alternative. The subsequent rise of political Islam as a perceived legitimate resistance force further bolstered its political and popular standing across the region, replacing centralized Arab governments often tied to the West.
However, recent geopolitical shifts have fractured Arab unity, with the weakening or fall of pivotal Arab monarchies and central regimes leading to a disintegration of unified Arab positions on the Palestinian issue, which ultimately served Israel by enabling it to consolidate control and advance its settlement project. The recent normalization agreements (like the Abraham Accords) between Israel and several Arab countries have been described as legitimizing Israel’s regional hegemony despite the ongoing occupation, with confronting Israel no longer being a priority for the signatory nations. In this context, the indirect role of Islamist movements—in contributing to the decline of the official Palestinian role and weakening centralized Arab governments—is seen as inadvertently serving Zionist and Israeli influence.
Egyptian journalist Osama Al-Dalil offers a particularly sharp criticism, asserting that the contemporary Islamic movement, especially that which arose concurrently with the Zionist movement, is not a truly religious phenomenon but a political project primarily seeking power and control. Al-Dalil controversially labels the Muslim Brotherhood as “Zionism in Islamic form,” on Al-Arabya channel arguing that these so-called Islamist groups have little genuine connection to religion and instead use the concept of “political Islam” as a façade. He claims they have effectively “made religion into a nationality,” turning faith into a tool for achieving political agendas and regional influence. Extending this critique, Al-Dalil views groups like Hamas not as genuine resistance but as “political contractors” whose actions are entangled in covert agendas involving both Iran and Israel, thereby reinforcing the argument that many actors in the conflict are driven by deeper, non-religious political goals that do not align with the true will of the people.