By Mirna Fahmy

The Japanese government’s initiative to designate four Japanese towns as “hometowns” for African workers, aimed at cultural and educational exchange, was prematurely halted in September 2025 following intense public backlash and protests.

Announced by Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba in August 2025 during the 9th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD 9), the program, managed by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), designated towns for workers from four African nations, including Kisarazu for Nigerians, Nagai for Tanzanians, Sanjō for Ghanaians, and Imabari for Mozambicans. 

The program’s stated purpose was for short-term cultural exchange, using visas with a duration of less than 90 days.

Despite the program’s limited scope, it faced severe backlash fueled by misinformation. A false statement from the Nigerian government, amplified on social media, wrongly claimed the program included a special visa category for skilled workers to live and work in Japan—a claim explicitly denied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The resulting anxiety culminated in anti-immigration protests in early September across major cities, including Osaka. Protesters, driven by fears of increased African visa holders, carried slogans such as “end mass immigration.” The intense public reaction ultimately forced JICA to terminate the program.

“Overwhelmed by the sheer misinformation, the Japanese people might have felt the government was very rapidly kind of shifting gears on immigration without a lot of public input,” said Hilary Holbrow, Assistant Professor of Japanese Politics and Society at Indiana University Bloomington.

Holbrow emphasized that there’s significant cross-national collaboration among right-wing movements, evidenced by figures like the U.S. ‘s Charlie Kirk reportedly engaging with Japan’s Sanseito (Make Japan First). “They are sharing tactics on how to exploit anti-immigration fears for political purposes,” she adds. ” However, this is a cyclical, decades-long trend, not a new one. Just as in 1940s/50s Japan, immigrants become an easy scapegoat during times of social uncertainty and perceived government failure.”

Regarding the true nature of the initiative, Holbrow clarified that JICA is a foreign aid organization not an immigration policymaker, and the initiative was simply a study abroad program aimed at revitalizing less populated areas, not solving local labor shortages.

Demographic Crisis and Resistance to Change

The public anxiety took place against the backdrop of Japan’s profound and ongoing demographic decline.

As of 2025, the population has been shrinking for 16 consecutive years, having fallen to approximately 120.65 million after the largest annual drop since 1968 in the preceding year. Nearly one-third of residents are aged 65 or older, and the death rate significantly exceeds births. This demographic decline, visible in aging rural areas like the village of Nanmoku where two-thirds of residents are over 65, has led to severe labor shortages across many economic sectors.

For the full year of 2024, The Japanese economy grew by a slim 0.1%. continuing a multi-year growth trend. However, the growth rate was the weakest in four years, following a contraction in the first quarter. A 2018 IMF study found that severe demographic trends could reduce Japan’s real GDP by over 25% over 40 years without structural reforms. Other analyses suggest demographics will lower annual output growth by around 0.5 percentage points over several decades as the workforce contracts. 

The government has aggressively pushed policies to encourage Japanese citizens and foreign residents to move from major cities such as Tokyo, Kanagawa, Osaka, and Okinawa to depopulated rural areas, using grants up to ¥1 million and subsidies for renovating vacant houses (akiya). The ambitious goal is to encourage 10,000 people annually to relocate by 2026.

However, Holbrow notes that there is “simply more economic opportunity in cities,” and the subsidies are not large enough to compensate for the wage and opportunity differentials.

A significant hurdle is the cultural barrier. Holbrow’s research on long-term rural residents found they are not necessarily welcoming to migration, even of Japanese people from cities. She emphasises “newcomers are perceived as having different values and not fitting into the cooperative village society highlighting a deep cultural resistance to the government’s revitalization goals.”

The Paradox of Foreign Labor

The reaction to the JICA program reflects Japan’s history of strict immigration policies. Despite severe labor needs, large-scale guest worker programs were never adopted or it was put on a gradual phase.

Limited entry began in the late 1980s and 1990s, when the government first offered preferential visas to a limited number of foreign workers, particularly those of Japanese ancestry from South America, such as Brazilian and Peruvian Japanese.

Since the 2000s, Japan has initiated major programs to address labor shortages in sectors like manufacturing, construction, agriculture, and nursing care. These efforts primarily involve two programs: the Technical Intern Training Program (TITP) and, since 2019, the Specified Skilled Worker (SSW) visa.

As Professor Holbrow observed, “the people who come on that program are not considered immigrants by the Japanese government, because their visas are not indefinitely renewable.” Critically, these workers, she reveals, have limited freedom to change jobs, tying them to a single employer and leaving them vulnerable to exploitation by brokers or middlemen.

Interestingly, Holbrow’s research on white-collar foreign workers discloses a more nuanced picture. She found almost no wage disadvantage for foreign men in professional roles. She argues that the common perception of Japanese firms as xenophobic is an oversimplification, as white-collar firms are highly pragmatic, often hiring non-Japanese speakers to secure needed skills. However, she notes that “once employed, employees are constantly pressured to conform to the Japanese way causing stress, even if they avoid discriminatory pay.”

Now the number of foreign residents has become around 3.76 million (about 3% of the population as of 2024-2025) and the native population declines, foreign-born individuals and those of foreign ancestry will inevitably represent a larger share of Japan’s population. 

Holbrow argues that Japan, being at the forefront of this global demographic trend, has a unique opportunity to become a positive integration model for the rest of the world. 

To realize this potential, Holbrow stresses that Japan must effectively integrate all new residents, providing opportunities not only for high-skilled migrants but also for the second generation of those coming for lower-paying jobs. She highlights that the “crux of the challenge is ensuring that the children of immigrants receive a quality education (learning Japanese language well) that enables them to succeed in the Japanese labor market,” deeming educational equity and integration for immigrant children the number one priority for the Japanese government.

Cultural Impediments to Birthrate Reform

Government measures to boost the birthrate, including expanded child allowances, subsidized childcare, and proposals for a four-day work week, are struggling against cultural inertia.

Holbrow contends that the traditional post-war family model—a single male breadwinner and a wife in the home—is economically unsustainable today, yet the work culture hasn’t adapted. “Change is difficult because neither gender wants to relinquish the power associated with the old model: men’s economic power in the workplace, and women’s power as the decision-maker in the home.”

Furthermore, Holbrow’s 15 years  research reveals that the problem is not just overwork. Even women in elite companies who work long hours and conform to the overwork culture often do not attain equality with men. She stresses that firms must be more transparent and recognize that the overwork culture is “bad for everyone,” urging companies to look beyond work hours to identify and correct systemic inequalities.

Political Turbulence: Ishiba Resigns and Takaichi Faces Constraints

Amid the JICA controversy, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba resigned on September 7, 2025. The official reason was the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) disastrous performance in the July 2025 parliamentary elections, where losses were primarily linked to public discontent over economic issues like rising living costs.

Ishiba’s short tenure marks a return to the “revolving door” of Japanese leadership that was common before Shinzo Abe’s long term. Holbrow attributes Abe’s extended success partly to “just good timing,” as his time in office coincided with intense labor shortages that forced employers to offer better conditions. She notes that the current leadership faces a much more difficult international environment with too many concurrent crises.

Attention now turns to Sanae Takaichi, who could become Japan’s first female Prime Minister. Holbrow believes that even if Takaichi is successful, it’s unlikely she can push any “truly sort of maverick policy.” 

First, she faces political constraints. The LDP lacks a majority, meaning any new coalition government would force her to appease coalition partners and potentially the opposition. Second, there are international constraints. Holbrow notes that Abe had a strong relationship with Donald Trump, and it is unclear if Takaichi could build a similar bond with the US, Japan’s most significant international partner. 

Finally, she faces sexist constraints as a potential first female PM. Holbrow warns that “all eyes will be on her to sort of not mess up,” with many observers “kind of waiting for evidence to confirm their stereotypes that a woman is not suitable for the role.” 

“Ultimately, Takaichi would be constrained by political reality, the challenging international landscape, and prevailing social biases,” she comments.