By Mirna Fahmy

On November 24, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump signed an Executive Order (EO) initiating the process to designate certain chapters of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).

The order specifically mandated a review of Muslim Brotherhood chapters in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, with a report due in 45 days, followed by potential designations and sanctions.

In a statement sent to Arabi21, the group said it firmly opposes the executive order issued on the 24th of this month. It stressed that the move is politically motivated and the result of external pressure from Israel and the UAE to push President Donald Trump’s administration to issue the decision. The statement said: “Many Democratic governments, including the United States government, have previously reviewed such proposals and reached the same conclusion: that classifying the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group is completely detached from reality and not supported by any evidence (..) The facts have not changed.”

The most striking detail of the executive order was the omission of Qatar and Türkiye, two nations widely known as major state sponsors and safe havens for the Muslim Brotherhood across the Arab world and globally.

The order’s text justified the inclusion of specific nations: Egypt was cited due to leadership statements inciting violence after October 7, 2023; Lebanon for its alliance with Hezbollah against Israel; and Jordan for its support for Hamas.

Qatar and Türkiye were excluded due to their crucial roles as key US allies.

Qatar hosts significant US military bases and plays a vital role as a mediator in the Gaza conflict. Exerting pressure through designation was deemed undesirable, as Qatar provides crucial logistical support for US operations in the Middle East, despite criticism over its financial support for the MB.

Türkiye is a NATO member whose regional influence is seen as serving US interests in countering Iran and Russia. Its inclusion risked creating major confrontation within the NATO alliance, particularly since Türkiye’s ruling party, the AKP, has strong ideological and political ties with the Muslim Brotherhood.

A full designation of the global MB could hinder cooperation with Doha and Ankara, which have historically tolerated the group. Arab sources noted the exemption as a sign of “confusion” within the US administration regarding the group’s “most dangerous sponsors,” and pressure from Saudi Arabia and the UAE is anticipated to expand the scope in the future.

The order’s targeting of Muslim Brotherhood chapters in Egypt and Jordan highlights the complex, and sometimes contradictory, status of the group within these specific nations.

Despite being officially banned in Egypt since the 2013 revolution and classified as a terrorist entity by the government, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has found ways to survive, leading to complexities surrounding the US action. The group maintains a presence through non-hierarchical, decentralized networks built on personal and familial ties. Members use coded messages and external media outlets in locations like Türkiye, Qatar, and London to manage activities from exile and prison such as exiled leaders like Mahmoud Ezzat–who has been alleged by the Egyptian Interior Ministry for establishing and supervising the Brotherhood’s armed wing and managing “terrorist and sabotage operations” within the country after June 2013. Ezzat was later arrested in August 2020 and subsequently sentenced to life in prison.

In Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood’s activities were officially banned on April 23, 2025, when the Minister of Interior declared the group an “illegal association.” This ban followed a July 2020 Court of Cassation ruling that dissolved the group, though that decision had not been fully implemented until 2025. Paradoxically, despite this legal status, the MB’s political wing, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), demonstrated significant political clout in September 2024. The IAF achieved a historic electoral victory by winning 31 out of 138 seats in the Jordanian House of Representatives, establishing itself as the largest single parliamentary bloc.

Experts in the Arab World said that Trump’s decision represents a significant strategic shift in US policy toward the Muslim Brotherhood: it is not merely a declaration, but a legally binding and enforceable process under the guise of security. The potential repercussions vary from country to country: in Egypt, it could be used to bolster the regime’s position; in Jordan, it may test the balance between stability and security interests; and in Lebanon, the financial and security risks are substantial. Also, managing this decision domestically requires wisdom from the affected countries: not only in terms of implementing the sanctions, but also in terms of maintaining social and political equilibrium.

The Syria Paradox and Heightened Scrutiny of Qatar

This context of selective targeting and internal contradiction fueled intense criticism of the executive order, seen by many as symptomatic of the US President’s inconsistent foreign policy toward Islamist-rooted movements. The criticism was powerfully amplified by the diplomatic normalization with Syria’s new government. President Trump, who initially gained support for his rhetoric against radical Islamist ideologies, notably welcomed Syria’sPresident Ahmed al-Sharaa—a former leader of the Al-Qaeda-linked group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—to the White House and even presented him with a gift of perfume. This diplomatic shift, especially given the history of al-Sharaa’s organization and the fact the US had previously placed a bounty on his head, was viewed as wildly inconsistent with the administration’s stated aim of dismantling Islamist extremism.

Adding to the controversy, following Al-Sharaa’s assumption of power, Israel reportedly took military control over the remaining Syrian portion of the Golan Heights buffer zone very easily. Concurrently, Jewish synagogues in Syria were reportedly re-opened without the usual restrictions, which observers found jarring given the deep anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli rhetoric traditionally propagated by groups like the MB and ISIS. These combined events—the US embracing a former Al-Qaeda-linked leader, Israel’s expansion of control, and the new Syrian government’s overtures—sparked concerns among critics about a deeper, unstated connection between the global Islamist movement, Israel, the US, and Qatar.

This perception of a soft or compromised US foreign policy directly led to increased public pressure and scrutiny on Qatar—the country that hosts the MB-linked Hamas political bureau—especially among pro-Israel voices and hardline Republican lawmakers like Senator Ted Cruz and Representative Jared Moskowitz, who questioned the perceived Qatari influence that limited the ban.

Activists and commentators including Laura Loomer––an American far-right political activist–– was quick to decry the order as on the internet as “weak,” arguing that excluding Türkiye and Qatar, the organization’s primary state backers, constituted a major oversight. Loomer referred to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) research by Mariam Wahba, which stated that “Scholars aligned with the pro-Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar-based International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) are celebrating Iranian missile attacks on Tel Aviv. Former Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani sponsored the creation of the IUMS in 2004, and it is reportedly backed by the Qatari royal family.

Wahba replies to Loomer explaining that the core problem is that Qatar and Türkiye, while serving as major financial and media havens for the MB, do not actually host formal, structured, or indigenous MB chapters in the same way that Egypt or Jordan do. These two countries allow individual operatives, leaders-in-exile, and financial/media networks to operate, but without a clear, defined “nucleus” chapter, it is nearly “impossible” to enforce a designation against a non-existent organization. She added on X that The U.S. law requires targeting a foreign organization that meets the specific statutory criteria for terrorism. Since the MB is a decentralized network, targeting the national chapters is the appropriate legal tool, rather than attempting a movement-wide ideological designation, which is harder to defend in court. Henceforth, once the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Lebanese chapters are officially designated as FTOs/SDGTs, any individual or financial entity that knowingly provides material support or resources to those specific designated chapters (or their leaders) is committing a federal crime under U.S. law, regardless of where they are located.

It was against this backdrop of intense scrutiny and accusations of terror financing that the Qatari Prime Minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, chose to engage in a highly public dialogue with American broadcaster Tucker Carlson at the Doha Forum 2025. Seeking to answer these concerns, the Prime Minister made a series of revelations. He countered allegations that Qatar funds the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) by clarifying that Qatar’s relationship with the group was initiated at the explicit request of the United States. He explained that this relationship, which fully solidified with the opening of Hamas’s office in Doha in 2012, was primarily for the purpose of “communication regarding a ceasefire and facilitating the delivery of aid to the Gaza Strip,” with its roots dating back 19 years to Hamas’s participation in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections. Sheikh Mohammed affirmed that all Qatari aid delivered to the Palestinian people was implemented with complete transparency and under the supervision of the United States, a process which Israel itself facilitated.

He asserted that claims of Qatar providing funding to Hamas were “baseless” and aimed at sabotaging the US-Qatar relationship. Regarding regional tensions, the Prime Minister stated that President Trump had expressed “disappointment and shock” at a reported Israeli attack on Doha, which he dismissed as media reports intended to undermine the relationship. He concluded by stressing that Qatar’s financial support will go to the Palestinian people, and he endorsed the Trump administration’s plan for a political solution based on the two-state solution.

The Roots of Radical Islamism: A History of Strategic Alliances

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna in the city of Ismailia. The group arose as a reaction to the British occupation, the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate, and the perceived weakness of the Muslim world in the face of colonialism. Al-Banna sought to fund them through social and missionary activities, beginning small in Ismailia and building a popular base by providing aid for the poor before moving to Cairo.

Al-Banna himself acknowledged in his memoirs that the group received 500 Egyptian pounds from the Anglo-French Suez Canal Company, on the recommendation of the British Embassy in Cairo, to establish a mosque and its headquarters. At that time, Britain used the Muslim Brotherhood as a means of containing the growing anti-British nationalist movements in Egypt, such as Saad Zaghloul’s Wafd Party, by supporting an Islamist current focused on social reform rather than direct political confrontation.

Britain viewed the Brotherhood as a reliable bulwark against popular nationalist changes and a tool to advance its interests in the Middle East. This strategy persisted for decades, with the group later used as leverage against Arab governments and for intelligence gathering.

The Muslim Brotherhood evolved from a social and religious movement into a political and military organization in the 1940s with the establishment of its “Special Apparatus” for military training. This apparatus attracted Egyptian army officers, including Gamal Abdel Nasser, who joined the Brotherhood before forming their own Free Officers Movement. The relationship with the Free Officers began in the late 1940s when seven officers, including Nasser, joined the Special Apparatus and participated in the 1948 Palestine War. However, upon their return, Nasser rejected the Free Officers Movement’s affiliation with the Brotherhood, preferring independence despite the Brotherhood’s attempts to integrate or recruit them.

The Brotherhood initially supported the 1952 coup that overthrew the monarchy, but ideological differences—political Islam versus Nasser’s socialist nationalism—led to a later, bitter clash and the group’s banning. Concurrently, the United States viewed the Brotherhood as an anti-communist tool from the 1950s onward, providing indirect intelligence and financial support to counter Soviet expansion, particularly later in Afghanistan. American contacted with the Muslim Brotherhood continued as a strategic alternative, even after Nasser’s regime, which initially received US support, turned towards the Soviet Union.

Then the MB began to spread internationally with local branches in other countries in the late 1930s and 1940s, and it developed a truly decentralized, global presence largely as a result of severe state repression in Egypt during the 1950s and 1960s.

Later, Anwar Sadat brought the Muslim Brotherhood back into the political arena in the 1970s as a counterweight to the influence of the left and the communists after Nasser’s death, and as a strategy to bolster his Islamic legitimacy. He released imprisoned members in exchange for their non-opposition to his liberalization policies, forming a base of support against leftist movements. This cooperation continued until the assassination attempt against him in 1981.

Ideological Orientation and Geopolitical Impact

The MB’s Islamic ideology refers to political interpretations of Islam that transform the religion into a comprehensive system integrating faith, governance, and society, derived from principles such as God’s sovereignty, consultation (shura), justice, and equality, as discussed in academic analyses. Its objectives focus on reviving Islamic identity against colonialism and secularism, establishing an “Islamic state,” implementing Sharia law, and unifying the Muslim community through political or military jihad. These movements vary from social reformist to radical revolutionary, often rejecting Western democracy in favor of a comprehensive Islamic model.

Despite the ideology always including the concept of union and destroying Israel and Zionism, what’s ongoing in reality points to a paradoxical effect. Maher Farghali, an Egyptian researcher specializing in political Islam, has been quoted in the Egyptian newspapers  that radical Islamic ideology has played a powerful role in the Middle East and North Africa by promoting sectarian polarization and internal divisions, thereby weakening Arab states and opening the door to foreign interventions, including Israel’s interests.

Farghali highlights how groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist jihadists have employed extremist rhetoric focused on the “caliphate” and “jihad,” leading to internal conflicts in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. This, in turn, has served Israel by diverting Arab efforts from the Palestinian cause. Furthermore, this ideology contributed to the creation of clandestine, non-hierarchical organizations, such as those within the Muslim Brotherhood, which have generated internal violence exploited by Israel to justify its security expansion, as in the case of its indirect support for Hamas, which undermines Palestinian unity. Farghali asserts that the existence of historical ties between the Muslim Brotherhood and Israel, arguing that radicalism helped weaken Arab nationalism, allowing Israel to consolidate its regional hegemony without unified resistance, particularly after the Arab Spring uprisings. This role is seen as a “scheme” serving Zionism by fragmenting the region, based on evidence from leadership statements and incidents outside embassies.

The Geopolitical Endgame: Linking Islamist Fragmentation to the Bernard Lewis Plan

The strategic contradictions in U.S. foreign policy and the paradoxical effects of radical Islamist ideology on regional stability resonate strongly with the controversial geopolitical framework often attributed to Bernard Lewis (1916–2018). Lewis, a highly influential British-American historian specializing in Islamic history and the Ottoman Empire, frequently advised policymakers, including the Bush administration. His concepts for reshaping the Middle East are widely discussed in academic and geopolitical critiques, often under the umbrella of a “Bernard Lewis Plan” or a “New Middle East.”

At its core, the alleged Lewis framework—often linked to the Zionist “Oded Yinon Plan” for a Greater Israel—proposes the disintegration of large, unified states. The goal is to destroy the unity of Islamic society and divide the great countries of the Middle East into smaller, weaker entities based primarily on ethnic or sectarian composition. This fragmentation is alleged to be part of a larger strategy to ensure the permanent weakness of the region, thereby making it easier for the United States to control its wealth, and for the Zionist entity to prevent the establishment of unified Arab opposition. This division has been considered to be a cornerstone of an expansionist project for the establishment of Greater Israel, which it is believed to extend from the Nile Valley to the Euphrates. The Zionist hope, in this context, is that these new, sectarian-based states would become de facto satellites of Israel. Lewis is also cited for encouraging Western countries to wage war and create chaos in the region to confront Islamic society, particularly toward the end of his life.

The most direct implementation attributed to this framework is the destruction of unified nation-states and their breakdown into warring, smaller entities:

• Iraq (2003): The U.S. invasion, which Lewis advised the Bush administration on (though Lewis later denied advising the invasion itself), dismantled the central Iraqi state apparatus and led to sectarian civil war and Kurdish autonomy.
• Syria (Post-2011): The civil war led to a breakdown of central authority, fracturing the state along its pre-existing ethno-sectarian lines (Alawite, Kurd, Sunni).
• Lebanon: Its system of sectarian political power-sharing and current economic collapse drives the country toward the “tri-sectarian strife” that the fragmentation theory predicts.

The effective neutralization of Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon through internal conflict left Iran and non-state actors like Hezbollah and Hamas as the primary opposing forces, rather than unified Arab armies. The resultant chaos created a geopolitical vacuum which Israel and other regional powers were able to fill. Even the Arabian Peninsula, which was united for centuries, has been divided into the smaller countries known today as “The Gulf,” including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, and Sultanate Oman.

This entire framework sheds light on Israeli strategic thinking, as evidenced by Netanyahu’s 1994 interview where he used a hypothetical scenario to explain the difference in reaction time if peace treaties were violated: he claimed it would take the Egyptian army seven days to move from the Suez Canal to the Israeli border, but without Israeli presence, it would take the Syrian army only seven hours to storm into the Galilee. This has been interpreted by some in the Arab media, especially the Egyptian media, as an indication of Netanyahu’s desire to see Egypt, or at least Sinai, in chaos, allowing Israel to use the resulting vacuum to expand its security buffer.

Lewis, to achieve a better future pointed to Türkiye, Israel, and women as “three factors which could help transform the Middle East. He saw Türkiye as a secular, Westernized model; Israel as a functioning, technological democracy in the region; and the empowerment of women as necessary to unlock human development and institutional performance.