By Thobile Jiwulane

As South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) confronts an existential crisis, doubts loom over whether the once-dominant ruling party can retain relevance in the upcoming local government elections. 

Once celebrated as a liberation movement under the leadership of Nelson Mandela, the ANC now faces predictions of eventual national defeat after its dismal performance in the May 2024 general election. The year-end municipal polls are widely seen as a decisive test—a barometer that will signal either the party’s recovery or its impending demise.

At the weekend, the ANC’s top leadership convened a Lekgotla—a high-level caucus to chart strategy for the year-end local government elections. Central to the discussions is how to sharpen service delivery and rebuild trust with the electorate. Addressing the gathering, President Cyril Ramaphosa pledged that the party would prioritize fixing local government, undertaking an overhaul, and restoring basic services. 

But analysts argue it is too late—the horse has already bolted. The ANC had more than 30 years in power, yet failed to deliver on the very promises it now repeats. Instead most ANC-led municipalities have collapsed, with services grinding to a halt, particularly in rural provinces, while urban metros limp along under the weight of graft and political infighting. This erosion of governance has cost the party public trust and contributed to its loss of power. 

However, this has not dampened Ramaphosa’s determination to act, or at least promise to act to reverse the failures. He pledged at the Lekgotla that through a new “six‑point plan” the ANC will remove underperforming and corrupt officials, strengthen infrastructure maintenance, and build administrative capacity to restore confidence in local government

The meeting takes place as the ANC’s national executive committee, the party’s second‑highest decision‑making body, grapples with reports that its support may decline even further, dropping from the 40% it currently holds in Parliament to below 30% in the forthcoming local elections. President Ramaphosa is expected to announce the exact election date within the next month or two. The previous municipal elections, held on 1–2 November 2021, saw a record 325 political parties and nearly 95,000 candidates contesting, including more than 1,500 independents.

Prior to losing its parliamentary majority, the ANC had been South Africa’s sole ruling party. Its dominance was broken when it made empty promises to voters, and its support eaten by corruptions and fell from 57% in 2019 to just 40% in the May 2024 general election, paving the way for a ten‑party government of national unity. 

This time, however, most observers predict the ANC will find itself relegated to the opposition benches. Political analyst Prince Mashele, an uncompromising vocal critic of the party, has argued that the ANC would be fortunate to secure even 20% in future general elections. 

Indeed, the year‑end local polls are expected to serve as a crucial indicator of how the party might fare in 2029.  A widespread view that the ANC’s poor showing in 2024 signalled the beginning of the end of its political dominance. It had monopolised power since South Africa’s first democratic election in 1994, when Nelson Mandela became the country’s first Black president – four years after his release from jail. He led a non‑racial constitutional order —breaking decisively with apartheid rule.

Today, however, the long liberation honeymoon the ANC once enjoyed appears to be over. The electorate has turned against the party.  In the 2016 local elections, it lost control of key metros in Gauteng (the affluent Johannesburg and the country’s capital Tshwane metros) and Nelson Mandela Bay in the Eastern Cape. 

Observers warn the trend is set to deteriorate further. Nelson Mandela University’s Professor Ntsikelelo Breakfast underscores a strong link between the ANC’s declining voter turnout and its ongoing inability to provide essential services.

After nine years of misgovernance by Zuma accompanied by graft, Ramaphosa’s promise of a new dawn raised hopes of the ANC’s redemption. It was never to be as Ramaphosa’s ANC continued where Zuma left off  with maladministration – poor service delivery and corruption. In all the 30 years plus in power, the ANC was unable to address immigration. This saw illegal and undocumented immigrants competing with local citizens for jobs and easily accessing state social grants, healthcare and education at the expense of locals. Only recently did it introduce a Border Management Authority system and border patrols, that is bedevilled by teething problems while the exodus if illegal migrant from neighbouring countries continue.

As Ramaphosa serves the final stretch of his two terms as ANC president and head of state, his departure looms. Yet the challenges confronting both the party and the country persist, and whether he can resolve them in the time that remains is still uncertain.

His close supporters, however, want him to remain head of state and serve out both terms in full—even if that would reintroduce the “two centres of power,” where the state presidency and the party leadership run in parallel and compete for influence. Should this scenario materialize, it would vindicate former president Thabo Mbeki, who once insisted on seeking a third term as ANC leader, a move that was rejected by the party, fusing the two positions into one.

With Ramaphosa nearing the end of his final term as both leader of the ANC and head of state, Deputy President Paul Mashatile might appear to be the natural successor. Yet his path to the presidency is far from assured. Powerful factions within the party are working to block his ascent, citing allegations of corruption linked to his tenure in Gauteng and his failure to declare ownership of a property in Cape Town.

If Mashatile is successfully sidelined, he would become the first ANC deputy president to break with the long-standing tradition of ascending to the Union Buildings. Thabo Mbeki succeeded Nelson Mandela, Jacob Zuma followed Mbeki, and Cyril Ramaphosa came after Zuma. This succession pattern reflects an ANC convention dating back to at least the 1960s.

With Mashatile’s fate almost sealed, a pressing question now confronting South Africa is who will succeed Ramaphosa at the helm of the ANC. Some voices are promoting the name of business magnate Patrice Motsepe, who also serves as president of the Confederation of African Football. Motsepe, Ramaphosa’s brother-in-law, is increasingly portrayed as a figure capable of rescuing the party and reversing its downward spiral.

Johannesburg’s Sunday World has reported that even Helen Zille, chairperson of the DA’s federal council, has expressed support for Motsepe, who is also a philanthropist. Zille’s endorsement may rest on the belief that, as a billionaire and not a traditional ANC cadre, Motsepe would be inclined to champion free-market policies.

Zille is looking beyond the ANC, expressing hope that if Motsepe were to secure the position, he could eventually emerge as the country’s future leader. In that scenario, his status as a billionaire head of state might incline him toward embracing outright capitalism—representing a sharp departure from the ANC’s traditionally left-leaning, though often neoliberal, orientation.

Motsepe himself, however, has yet to confirm whether he is available or willing to contest the position. But he can’t contest without the initial endorsement of the ANC, as he is currently not a member of the party NEC, from where all ANC presidents are recruited.

Other potential contenders include ANC deputy secretary-general Nomvula Mokonyane, who has signaled her intention to enter the race. Analysts, however, see her prospects as slim, pointing to corruption allegations linked to Bosasa—a politically connected company accused of securing state tenders through bribery. 

These allegations, which date back to her tenure in the Gauteng provincial administration, are expected to resurface during her campaign. Nonetheless, some observers argue that the ANC may still permit her candidacy, drawing parallels with Jacob Zuma, who rose to party president and later head of state despite facing serious charges stemming from the multibillion-rand South African–French Arms Deal scandal. As in the past, other candidates might announced their availability closer to the ANC conference, in 2027.

The ANC may still elect its own president, but this time it is no longer guaranteed that the individual will ascend to the position of head of state. The party cannot claim the presidency outright, as it no longer commands the overwhelming parliamentary majority required to determine the outcome. While in terms of South Africa’s system Parliament elects the head of state, this time it has to respect multiparty consensus rather than follow one party dominance as the decisive factor, as in the past.

There is a general view that the election of South Africa’s next president may not follow the established pattern when Ramaphosa leaves office in 2029. A deviation from tradition appears probable, as his successor may not automatically come from the ANC, which no longer holds a majority sufficient to determine the presidency at state level. Given that the unity government is built on consensus, the choice of the next president could emerge from consultations among the ten parties that make up the GNU.

The Democratic Alliance, as the second-largest partner in the GNU after the ANC, may press for a rotational presidency. Several local analysts have suggested that South Africa could, for the first time, be led by a non-ANC president. Julius Malema, leader of the radical left-wing Economic Freedom Fighters, has echoed this view—going further to predict that the next president would be white and drawn from the DA. Although Malema opposes the prospect of a white-led government, he nonetheless underscored its inevitability, attributing the outcome to the ANC’s failures.

One thing is certain: the new dispensation ushered in by the Government of National Unity has fundamentally reshaped South Africa’s political landscape. It has brought an end to decades of one-party dominance and introduced an era in which consensus, rather than unilateral control, defines the process of decision-making.