Whether the ceasefire agreement worked or did not work, the Gulf and Lebanon are being put on the front lines of Iran’s war in the newly shaped region, witnessing harsh and pivotal consequences, Professor Elham Manea tells Diplomatic Insider.
By Mirna Fahmy
Since the United States (U.S.) and Israel launched a large-scale attack on Iran, killing its Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on Feb 28, to terminate the Mullah era that put the entire Middle East region into endless proxy conflicts, President Donald Trump stated on March 6 that the U.S. would only accept “unconditional surrender”.
Starting from March 23, the rhetoric began to soften. Pakistan stepped in as a mediator, sparking a cycle of delays that pushed the final strike to April 7 at 8:00 PM ET, whereas the Department of War would blow off Iran’s energy infrastructure.
The world was on pins and needles, setting a countdown for Trump’s order for the blow off as he showed seriousness on his Truth Social by saying: “A whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again. I don’t want that to happen, but it probably will.”
But the big bang never came. Instead of an order to fire, just two hours before the deadline, Trump announced a 15-day ceasefire between the US, Israel, and Iran, praising Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif as a “good guy” whose proposal was too good to pass up.
What has been missing in between is the Gulf that has been receiving Iran’s continued strikes despite the ceasefire agreement from 8 am on Wednesday, April 8. Cessation of hostilities against the Gulf was notably absent from the 15 terms and conditions that Trump imposed on Tehran, even though a guarantee to keep the Strait of Hormuz open—a move that serves both Iranian and Gulf interests—was included.
According to Professor Elham Manea, an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Zurich, this isn’t just an oversight—it’s a message.
“We’ve seen this pattern before, most notably in 2019, when Houthi militias struck Saudi oil facilities and the Gulf states expected a strong U.S. response that never materialized,” Manea explains. “Despite the considerable influence Gulf countries believed they had cultivated with the Trump administration, reinforced by his recent visits to the region, that leverage proved illusory once again.”
During the two-week ceasefire, U.S. Vice President JD Vance traveled to Islamabad, Pakistan, for 21 hours to lead high-stakes negotiations aimed at ending the US-Iranian conflict and achieving lasting peace. However, the talks concluded without a breakthrough on April 12.
In the second round, President Trump prevented his representatives from traveling to Islamabad for further talks on April 25-26, 2026. At every talk, Iran didn’t agree to the 15 terms to dismantle its nuclear weapons, end its regional proxies, and open the Hormuz Strait, which has been on and off.
Professor Manea suggests that Trump’s open negotiation attempts stem from his desire to be victorious. However, a strategic miscalculation took place following the February strike. The assumption was that killing Khamenei would cause the regime to collapse. History tells us otherwise: when you start a war, you rarely control its consequences. Rather than fracturing the Iranian leadership, Manea pointed out that the strike had the opposite effect — hardliners consolidated power, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) tightened its grip on the country.
Trump now finds himself under pressure both from external actors and from within his own political base, and his instinct is to declare victory and exit. The danger, as Manea warns, is that he may be underestimating the nature of the group he is now negotiating with.
The IRGC is now fighting for its own survival as the regime is not as strong as it was at the beginning of the revolution in 1979. Public support has eroded, and legitimacy is absent. The possibility of change from within exists, but under tight conditions. The Iranian people find themselves sandwiched between IRGC brutality inside the country and relentless U.S. and Israeli strikes on infrastructure from outside, leaving little room in the moment for the kind of organic uprising that could shift the balance.
The China dimension adds another layer of complexity. Iran is central to Beijing’s economic vision, and the disruption of oil supply hits China harder than the U.S. Manea states it was partly this calculus of Trump’s administration to strike at China’s energy interests and assert dominance in an escalating global rivalry.
China, meanwhile, pushed Pakistan to mediate, hoping to stabilize its own energy supply. Yet Manea is clear that Beijing has no appetite for a direct regional role. It is mainly focused on the economy and business, and it is taking a long-term approach that doesn’t serve the current circumstances. That’s why, though Saudi Arabia has accepted Pakistani troops pushed by China, it has worked with Ukraine in the defence system strategies.
As another countdown for the big clash is set on the timer due to the failed negotiations, it is not negligible that the Gulf is still caught between competing powers, absorbing consequences it had no hand in shaping. Though there are many claims that some Gulf countries will disappear and some will merge with existing lands, Manea provides another perspective that the ongoing war will not draw an end to the Gulf model–It will end their reliance on specific partners such as the U.S.
That shift opens the door to China as an alternative anchor. But as Manea makes clear, Beijing is not positioned, nor willing to fill the vacuum the U.S. is leaving behind. And in that gap, a new regional power is quietly consolidating its position. “We are seeing right now a change in the regional order,” Manea says, “with Israel becoming the hegemon, the real power in the region that cannot be ignored in the long run.”
So far, the Gulf focuses on defense rather than retaliation separately, not even as a unified front. Manea explains that the costs are high if they attack, especially with Saudi Arabia, where Houthis will attack harder, affecting its economy, which wasn’t going well before the war. Also, the rivalry between the UAE and Saudi Arabia — visible in Sudan, Yemen, and across Africa showed how their cooperation has real limits, as Manea mentions, even in a crisis. “They stick together when the pressure peaks, but that solidarity has a ceiling.”
With negotiations stalled in late April 2026, Iranian state-linked media began broadcasting explicit threats against Gulf infrastructure, cities, and nations as part of a declared retaliatory campaign.
The energy sector is the primary target. Iranian media have warned of strikes against Saudi Arabia’s Ras Tanura Refinery and Jubail Petrochemical Complex, the UAE’s Al Hosn Gas Field, and Qatar’s Mesaieed Petrochemical Complex and Ras Laffan Refinery.
Major urban centers are also in the crosshairs. Specific warnings have been issued against Dubai, Doha, and Riyadh, with reports already surfacing of missile debris falling near Jebel Ali Port and targeting Dubai International Airport.
The conflict has extended beneath the surface and into the digital realm. IRGC-linked outlets have openly discussed severing undersea internet cables running through the Persian Gulf. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, along with U.S. installations in Kuwait and Bahrain, have been identified as active targets. Iran has also declared the Strait of Hormuz closed to all shipping headed to or from the UAE and Saudi Arabia, following a series of strikes on vessels navigating those waters.
Despite the past ceasefire agreement, Lebanon wasn’t freed from the crossfire between Israel and Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon. Amid these tense conflicts, a peace between Israel and Lebanon finally came about. On April 14, 2026, Israeli and Lebanese envoys met in Washington with U.S. facilitation, agreeing to a framework for future direct negotiations.
Israel’s stated goal is to achieve peace and normalization, which includes the disarmament of Hezbollah and ensuring its withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The Lebanese government, under President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, is trying to reassert state sovereignty, disarm Hezbollah, and break away from Iran’s influence. Israeli politicians have once expressed joy at Aoun becoming president because of his independence from Hezbollah, which they said would mark the beginning of the end of Hezbollah’s grip on the country.
Hezbollah, a major political and military force in Lebanon, has rejected the negotiations, insisting it will not disarm. There is also significant mistrust among Lebanese citizens toward Israeli intentions, especially after a previous 2024 ceasefire was marked by thousands of violations.
Manea is skeptical about peace implementation in the coming time and at a faster pace, not because of Hezbollah, but the wounds of the first civil war from 1975 to 1990 that were never really addressed or healed, and that fragility persists to this day.
But the critical question that Manea addresses is: “Do they have the army for that? And the army is not only weak, it is also infiltrated by Hezbollah members.”
Yet, there are some sparks of optimism to look at. “Hezbollah is weaker than before. Iran’s forward deterrence policy has crumbled before its eyes,” Manea adds. “With the exception of the Houthis, all of its proxies have been weakened. Syria is no longer a factor. Hezbollah is a shadow of what it once was; otherwise, the current government would never have been formed.”
The most certain part is that if Iran is defeated in this war, it may give the Lebanese government the leverage it needs to shrink and contain the Hezbollah threat.
Because of Hezbollah, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) took many parts of Southern Lebanon (about 6% of Lebanon’s total area–roughly 600 KM2) to not give any chance to Hezbollah from returning, and they established a “Yellow Line“. The Israeli military has banned Lebanese from returning to at least 47 of 62 villages.
Being afraid that Israel would annex the entire Southern Lebanon as it did with the Golan Heights in Syria, France, under President Emmanuel Macron, interfered. Paris advocates for a negotiated peace and broader demarcation, aiming to bring all weapons in Lebanon under state control to disarm Hezbollah and prevent Israel from going further into Southern Lebanon. The Israeli sources say that Israel views France as an unfair mediator for attempting to limit Israel’s military actions and failing to take strong action against Hezbollah.
Manea does not mince words about Israel’s negotiating posture. “Under Netanyahu, Israel appears to be negotiating with the Lebanese state with one hand while continuing to control southern Lebanese territory with the other,” she says. “They are at the table, but they are not leaving the areas they occupy. That is not a posture of full and honest intention.”
France’s role, in Manea’s reading, is precisely what makes Israel uncomfortable. “France has emerged as something of a check on Israel’s ability to operate the way Netanyahu is pushing for,” she explains. “And that is precisely why, in the negotiations that have been taking place, there have been clear attempts to exclude France from the process entirely.”
As the world is on edge to see how the US will respond following the collapse of negotiations, what connects Lebanon’s fragile negotiating table and the Gulf’s exposed flank is that they are fault lines in the same breaking ground. The regional order is shifting and is getting re-shaped.
Washington can strike, but cannot stabilize. Beijing can mediate, but will not lead. Paris wants a seat at the table but keeps finding the door closed. The Gulf states are taking hits they have no means to return. Lebanon is reaching for sovereignty with a hollowed-out army, a fractured society, and Hezbollah still armed and present on its soil.
The question is no longer whether the old order survives. It is what and who fills the vacuum it leaves behind.